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From a perspective of the media systems approach, we attempt to provide a media system 
model that accounts for the characteristics of the relationship between political and media 
systems in the democratization process of Korean society. Using the model, we explore 
the possibility by which media system has set the limit on the directions of political 
democratization. The notion of ‘political parallelism’ is employed to characterize the 
historical changes of the role of the news media in function of public spheres in relation to 
political system. The Korean way of ‘political parallelism’ accounts for the process by which 
mainstream newspapers and broadcasters have influenced political parties and civil society. 
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I. IntroductIon
during the democratic transition after the civil resistance against the 
authoritarian regime, how did the South Korean politics influence the media 
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and how in turn the media responded to it? How have the Korean media 
and the politics, both in a separate and in a combined manner, contributed 
to democratic consolidation after the transition? What kind of public sphere 
have the Korean media functioned as? And what consequences will the 
public sphere function of the Korean media bring for the democratization? 
to answer these questions concerning the media-politics interaction and its 
effects on the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in South 
Korea, we employ the notions of media and political systems and examine the 
ways in which the two systems interact with each other in contributing to the 
process of democratization. 
In this study, we propose a democratization model of media system on 
the basis of reviewing media systems dimensions Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
provided. then we add a dimension of functional role of the mass media 
as public spheres in society. together with the original four dimensions of 
media systems, this functional dimension provides a way to characterize 
Korean media system in terms of its distinctive roles in shaping political 
terrains in the process of democratization. In particular, through the prism 
of this model, we examine the ways in which Korean news media have 
strengthened their political power and played characteristic roles in affecting 
the democratic outlook in the course of democratization.
this study extensively makes use of the comparative media systems 
approach suggested by Hallin and Mancini (2004). However, our intention 
is not to exaggerate how Korean media system is comparable to other media 
models in Western countries. By proposing the Korean model of media 
system, we rather attempt to explore the possibility of extending the media 
system approach in order to account for the interactions between media and 
political systems in post-authoritarian democratic transitional countries. 
through this, we expect to bring a case for the democratization model of 
media systems from the vantage point of Korean experiences of the transition 
from an authoritarian society to democratic consolidation.1  
1 celebrating the 50 year anniversary of Korean Society for Journalism & communication 
Studies (KSJcS), there have been comprehensive evaluations and reflections on 
journalism and communication studies conducted to date. In the fields of political 
communication and journalism, review articles that overviewed past research, 
assessed the current outlook of journalism and communication studies, and suggested 
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II. tHe coMPArAtIVe MedIA SySteMS APProAcH 
In their book, Comparing Media Systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
investigated the relationship between media and political systems from the 
perspective of comparative systems approach. they proposed three models 
that described the patterns of interactions between media and politics 
based on the observations of different types of democracies in Western 
societies. Hallin and Mancini suggested that their models could be applied 
to other countries in Asia, eastern europe and Latin America with a little 
modification. We find their models helpful to capture the differences and 
similarities of countries from many other societies as well as Western 
countries. We do not think, however, the models are sufficient to account 
for some characteristic developments observed in the countries with some 
significant differences in historical and cultural back-grounds from Western 
countries. rather than simply borrowing their framework of modeling 
media systems, we analyze the preconditions under which such comparative 
approaches are possibly made and then figure out ways in which the 
comparative approach bears on examination of non-Western media systems. 
for future research were produced (yang 2009; Im, y. 2009; choe 2009). In the reviews, 
there was a recurring common theme: though we had been conducting studies on 
journalism and communications for half a century, we could not produce original 
theories that had contributed to building a general theory of communication based on 
our own experiences. this self-criticism then led to a demand for intense observations 
of our reality and theorization, which were to become the primary tasks for the future 
of journalism and communication studies. There was also a request to guard against 
indiscreet importation of Western theories. For example, Lee, Sang Gil (2004: 91) 
suggested a post-colonial defeatism working behind the acceptance that “the others 
(generally) create ‘theories’ and ‘philosophies,’ but we (particularly) can only create 
anything through ‘our contexts’ and ‘case studies’.” He argued that in order to conduct 
and accumulate empirical studies, we ourselves could not avoid producing theories. 
Also, cho, Hang Je (2008: 141-142) lamented the reality that “where phenomena that 
can be captured by Western theories are considered ‘interesting’ and ‘meaningful’, the 
ones that resist the application of Western theories are left unexamined.” He criticized 
that in this way we had produced theories that were not understandable on our own. 
But these two critics did not discuss whether theories could be ‘ours’ and, if possible, 
how to produce theories that are ‘distinctively ours.’
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1. Key Dimensions of the Comparative Media Systems Approach
Hallin and Mancini proposed a series of media and politics variables to 
categorize different media and political systems in Western societies. As 
for comparative dimensions of political systems, they considered the five 
dimensions: (a) political history, (b) role of the state, (c) consensus v. 
majoritarian government, (d) individual v. organized pluralism, and (e) 
development of rational-legal authority. Though these system characteristics 
drawn from the history of Western countries, they are also highly illuminating 
when applied to Western societies. They provide a comparison point against 
which experiences and institutions of non-Western countries are posed to 
reveal systematic differences between Western and non-Western democratic 
political systems. The five dimensions do not weigh the same when applied to 
the countries in democratization. For example, the historical experiences of 
democratization, which is a part of the dimension of political history together 
with the level of pluralism in Hallin and Mancini’s specification, stood out a 
critical factor that determines the relationship among other dimensions in 
political system. That is, depending on the natures of democratic transition 
and consolidation, roles of the state, level of pluralism, and rational legal 
authority diverge into many different kinds of inter-relations, which do not 
allow a generalization of Hallin and Mancini’s layout. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of applying Hallin and Mancini’s layout to 
the countries in the process of democratization, we believe the experiences 
of Korean democratization provide a revealing perspective from which the 
comparative dimensions of political system are rearranged to generate a 
valuable point about the relationship between media system and political 
system. For example, unlike the most of Western countries where a minimum 
level of liberal politics began to be established with institutionalization of 
rational-legal authority, 
Korean democracy in consolidation shows a stark contrast between a near 
completion of institutionalization of rational-legal authority in formal system 
and frequent negligence and violation of legal authority in practice. Part of 
the reason behind this contrast between formal institutions and informal 
practices of rational-legal authority stems from the unstable role of the state 
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issuing laws that not all the constituents of civil society accept as rational 
and legal. consequently during the democratic transition, the government 
was regarded both as a controller of democratic reform and as a target of 
democratic reform by different parts of civil society. In this article we propose 
a set of political systems variables that can capture the historical experiences 
of Korean democratization while maintaining the system comparative 
approach presented by Hallin and Mancini. they are (a) government 
authority during democratic transition and consolidation; (b) development of 
political parties, and (c) role of civil society movements in democratization.
Hallin and Mancini’s media dimensions are sufficiently general to be applied 
to media systems in developing countries: (a) development of newspaper 
industry, (b) political parallelism (c) journalistic professionalism and (d) role 
of the state in media system (i.e., strong v. weak state intervention). We think, 
however, that the following two points should be taken into account. First, 
rather than seeing these dimensions as equal and parallel with one another, 
one may want to consider hierarchical and causal relationships among them. 
For example, we find the development of newspaper industry has influenced 
the development of journalistic professionalism and the pattern of state 
intervention in Korean media system. It is also observed that specific forms of 
journalistic professionalism and role of the state have determined the degree 
of political parallelism. In our view, hypothesizing these kinds of relationships 
could be one way of developing Hallin and Mancini’s comparative systems 
approach within a non-Western context like Korean media system. 
Second, in order to illuminate the nature of the relationship between 
media and political systems variables, we find it helpful to take into additional 
considerations on the public sphere function of media and the democratic 
outlook of the society. cho, Hang Je (2008), following the suggestion made 
by Ferree (Ferree, et al. 2002), attempted to categorize  public spheres into 
(a) an elite representative public sphere, (b) a mass participatory public 
sphere, (c) a civic discursive public sphere, and (d) a counter public sphere. 
We generally accept his framework and expect that differing media systems 
will contribute to the operation of democracy in different ways according 
to the specific functions they perform in terms of management of public 
discourses. that is, in the societies under democratic transition like Korea, 
where its democratic outlook is still uncertain and contending paths to 
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democratization are proposed, the different paths of democratic consolidation 
could be foreshadowed by the kinds of functions the media system performs 
as a public sphere. For example, if the media function as a ‘representative 
elite public sphere,’ a watchdog and information provider, the path to 
democratization will heavily gear towards to a representative and market-
oriented democracy. on the other hand, if the media systems function as 
a ‘participatory public sphere,’ then the path will be more likely to lead to a 
participatory and deliberative democracy.     
2. The Systems Approach
Hallin and Mancini made it clear that the three media systems models are 
empirical rather than normative, which emphasizes their models are based on 
historical analyses of media systems established in specific social contexts.2 
Although normative values such as diversity, openness and autonomy are not 
explicitly praised in their description of media systems, their arguments are 
more than empirical in many ways. As they admitted, empirical observations 
and categorization can reveal the ways in which a certain condition of 
media systems will either lead to or limit materialization of normative 
values such as diversity and autonomy. For example, empirical modeling 
of commercialization of media industry can illuminate the way in which 
different levels of market development have consequences for establishment 
of normative values such as media autonomy and even journalistic 
professionalization. In principle, we are in agreement with this approach. 
However, we believe more attentions should be paid to the followings in order 
2 They of course theorized on their own idealistic premises. Although they avowed to 
overcome the limitations of The Four Theories of the Press which primarily focused 
on ‘philosophy’ or ‘ideology,’ it is hard to deny that they completely ruled out 
normative values implied in their modeling. Values such as diversity and autonomy 
were integrated in their classifying variables and the implications attached to them 
were presupposed in the descriptions of the resulting models. In addition, as they 
admitted, particular cases drawn from different countries are never homogenous and 
continuously changing defying to be consistently identified as the same model. We 
believe that the three comparative media systems models are basically ‘idealistic’ in 
the sense that they are abstract and suggest certain evaluative implications.  
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for empirical and systematic modeling to be fruitful.  
Hallin and Mancini’s comparative media systems approach does not 
give as much emphasis on “the systems theoretical approach” as on “the 
comparative approach.” As a result, they seem to skip the important question 
why in the first place we have to distinguish media system from other social 
systems and to treat it as a distinct sub-system like other de facto social 
systems such as political and economic systems. recognition of media system 
as a distinctive sub-system requires specification of media system as having 
the same qualities that other sub-systems have as well as featuring some 
distinctive qualities that other sub-systems do not. But we find their modeling 
wanting in regard to characterizing media system in relation to other sub-
systems within the total system. Since the base for justifying the autonomous 
status of media systems and its relations with other sub-systems is not clear, 
the theoretical and empirical criteria to measure the independency from 
other social sub-systems are not clear either. In fact, Hallin and Mancini did 
not present persuasive arguments for particularities of media system and 
for the interdependency of media systems with other sub-systems. It is our 
standpoint that the task of comparing the ‘particularities’ of individual media 
systems that operate within a society should be further based on systems 
theoretic considerations in their own rights. 
We need to reconsider the analysis of the interaction between political 
and media systems, which is the essential part of Hallin and Mancini’s 
comparative media systems approach. one cannot help but getting the 
impression that they regard media systems as depending on political systems 
but not the other way around. the idea that media systems mostly closely 
related to, sometimes as a subordinate part, political systems is generally 
supported by empirical evidences. However, the differentiation of media 
systems was never unilaterally determined by political systems. thus, the 
notions such as ‘mediatization of politics’ (Mazzoleni and Schultz 1999), 
‘institutional embracement of media logics by politics’ (Altheide and Snow 
1979), and ‘mediated politics’ (Bennett and entman 2001; nimmo and 
combs 1990) indicate that media system is not only passively determined 
by but also actively shape political systems. Media system, whether it is in a 
developed stage or not, contributes to the interactions among sub-systems 
including political systems.
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Media systems leave an important trace in the ruptures that are often 
found along the evolutionary paths of social systems, the fact of which 
has a significant implication for the nations under a democratic transition 
like Korea. For example, as it will be discussed later on in this article, ‘the 
strengthening of political power of the press’ during the roh tae Woo 
administration (1988-92) and the Kim young Sam administration (1993-
97) provide good examples. during these stages, the politically oriented 
press took over part of the roles of political system while party politics was 
not being fully established even after the remains of the past authoritarian 
regime began to wane. Interestingly, though the same period documented a 
rapid expansion of media market due to the first wave of de-regulation, the 
interaction between the media system and the economic system was not very 
extensive as compared to the one between the media system and the political 
system. the phenomenon that the politically oriented press filled the brief 
vacuum of political power can be interpreted as a consequence of media 
system’s active response to the changes at the system-level. This phenomenon 
characterized the nature of the relationship between the press and political 
parties in the transitional stage of democratization in Korea. 
We believe it is important to focus on the interactions between sub-
systems. to give an example, the rational-legal authority, one of the factors 
suggested by Hallin and Mancini that determine the nature of political system, 
operates in a very interesting way in Korea. Since the levels of effectiveness of 
the rational-legal authority among different sub-systems are quite even, one 
cannot help but wonder whether the rational-legal authority in Korea is not 
transitive across sub-systems. In the political system, it is secured at least on a 
surface level whereas in other sub-systems such as real estate and religion it is 
hard to find it working appropriately. It seems that the rational-legal authority 
is accepted on in some factions of society, which belies the generality of the 
rational-legal authority. A plausible explanation of the unevenness of the 
rational-legal authority would be the lack of interactions among some sub-
systems.  
criticizing the static normative approach and the idealistic conceptualization 
of the models proposed in The Four Theories of the Press, Hallin and Mancini 
pointed out empirical modeling should not presuppose a developmental 
assumption. That is, any of the proposed models should not be regarded as 
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more developed than the others. They explicitly emphasized that none of the 
models were an end point in the development of media systems. However, 
two things are glaring in their placement of the north Atlantic liberal model 
within the theoretical framework. First, the liberalist values such as media 
autonomy and journalistic professionalism were treated as a standard against 
which values of other media systems are compared and evaluated. Thus one 
may find it hard not to think of north Atlantic liberal model of media system 
as having a most developed set of journalistic values and practices. Second, 
the global tendency of converging media systems models into the north 
Atlantic liberal model was considered some sort of unavoidable process. 
thus for example, one may find it only natural to look at the process in 
which technological enhancement of the media leads to less emphasis of state 
regulations on media policies but more dominance of market forces in the 
media environment. 
We find it important to have an explicit assumption about social 
development especially when we are to apply the media systems approach 
to account for the processes of democratic transition and consolidation. 
Although we do not think it necessary to have a linear perspective or a 
teleological presupposition on social development in the system theoretical 
approach, we believe it indispensible to have an explicit outlook on the 
nature of changes when we talk about changes in media systems. Thus it is 
always important to ask the questions as to what kinds of values and ideas are 
presupposed in journalistic practices, what kinds of democracy the media are 
predisposed to endorse, in which direction of democratization the media and 
political systems 
III. cHArActerIStIcS oF KoreAn MedIA SySteMS
We first discuss the characteristics of Korean media system in terms of the 
media system dimensions presented by Hallin and Mancini: development 
of mass media; political parallelism; media professionalization; state 
interventions. We then add a dimension of public sphere functions of 
the media system as a criterion dimension and examine how adding this 
functional dimension leads to a new understanding of the media system in 
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regard to the types of media systems. table 1 summarizes the Korean model 
of media system in comparison to the Western media models. 
1. Rapid Development of the Korean Media Market and Its Instability 
Among the four dimensions that determine media systems models, the 
media market, that is, the ‘economic foundation of media systems,’ seems 
to work as an exogenous independent factor. other dimensions such as 
professionalization, political parallelism and governmental interventions 
work more like interdependent variables interacting with each other. 
Table 1. The Four Models: Western and Korean Media Systems
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Although Hallin and Mancini proposed the four dimensions as being on 
an equal level, they also seem to recognize the different degrees and levels 
of influences among the dimensions. It is hard not to notice that they 
prioritized the development of media markets over other dimensions. that 
is, within a system where economic foundation of the press is consolidated 
by the development of media markets, it is more likely the press becomes an 
independent system in a society, free from the supports or subsidies from 
other sub-systems. This kind of independence leads to professionalization of 
journalism since journalists in developed media markets are self-sufficient 
in terms of means as well as norms to support for them. consequently, the 
structural separation of media market from political and social influences, 
by and large, tend to facilitate journalistic professionalization while reduce 
‘political parallelism.’
the Korean media market expanded rapidly during the process of 
democratization. the monopolistic media system set by the authoritarian 
regime broke down and was transformed into an expanding media market. 
until the mid-1990s, the entire media market grew up rapidly as evidenced 
by the grown size of advertisement revenues. However, the government 
still intervened in the market as a large advertiser for newspapers as well 
as the competition regulator. the government sustained the monopolistic 
advertisement agency for broadcasters, which controlled the cash flows in the 
broadcasting sector.
The growth of media market is demonstrated in the total revenue of the 
media. For example, the total revenue of national daily newspapers rapidly 
increased from KW (Korean won) 137 billion in 1980 to KW 288 billion 
in 1985. A total of KW 1,717 billion was recorded in 1995. A comparable 
growth was documented in the growth of overall shares of three terrestrial 
broadcasting networks. Thus it was not the size of the market, but the speed 
that characterized the development of the Korean media system. non-
symmetrical regulation and preferential treatment of the government resulted 
in uneven yet fast growths in media sectors. However, the fast grown media 
industry in turn began to influence the government policies and initiatives. 
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2. Political Parallelism
‘Political parallelism’ is an elaboration of the concept of ‘party-press 
parallelism’ devised by Seymour-ure in 1974 (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 27-
30). originally, party-press parallelism refers to the degree of ideological 
correspondence between the press and political parties. The correspondence 
is composed of (1) the ideology of contents, (2) connections between the 
press and the political parties on individual and organizational levels, (3) the 
overlap of the readers and political party supporters, and (4) the conformity 
of the journalists to the causes of the political parties they support. Following 
Hallin and Mancini’s extension of the concept, we designate political 
parallelism as the extent to which the press culture is interrelated to the 
politics within the domains that Hallin and Mancini specified.
considering the fact that Korean journalists often move to the politics, 
and that the Korean press tends to be highly politically oriented not only in 
editorials but also in straight news, the degree of political parallelism in Korea 
must be very high. Political parallelism had been especially intensified since 
the ideological differentiation was accelerated after the democratic transition 
(nam 2006; yoon 2001). In Korea where civil society is underdeveloped and 
political parties are rather inefficacious in representing voices in civil society, 
it is the ideologically oriented press that wields a political initiative to lead 
political parties or social organizations. under the condition that conservative 
newspapers dominate the market and the public opinion, the initiative could 
be even stronger. Indeed the notion of ‘political empowerment of the press’ 
has been frequently mentioned when discussing the role or position of 
Korean news media (Kang, M. 2004; Pak and chang 2000). We believe that 
this empowered press constitutes the particularity of the Korean model of 
political parallelism which will be elaborated later in this article. 
3. Weak Journalistic Professionalization 
The level of professionalization depends partly on the freedom of the press 
since it implies the independence of journalists from external authorities. 
But it is also true that the reinforced economic foundation of the press 
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resulted from the growth of media market can provide a foundation of 
critical professionalism that watches and criticizes other social actors and 
institutions. According to Hallin and Mancini, for example, in Britain, the 
united States and central-northern european countries, where the freedom 
of the press was firmly established during the process of industrialization 
and democratization, the journalistic professionalization strengthened as the 
media market grew. 
Weak professionalization is one of the determining factors characterizing 
norms of Korean journalists. Since 1987 onward, the control of the news 
media by the transitional government had been weakened and the level of 
autonomy increased as the efforts for editorial independence had been paid 
off. While the journalists’ associations and unions gained their power within a 
space that was opened up by democratic transition, the autonomy of the news 
media became firmer through the on-going conflicts and negotiations within 
newsrooms between senior reporters and unionist journalists. For example, 
the introduction of the election of editors-in-chief in some newsrooms 
could be an indication of growing autonomy of the press in that period. 
However, during the democratic consolidation period, as the media market 
expanded and the competitions among them got severe, the pressures from 
proprietors, managerial groups and advertisers increased. They were poised 
as a threat to the news media’s internal and external autonomy since they had 
driven newsrooms more sensitive to intensified market competitions and 
advertisement revenues.
nam (2005: 8) noted that as the democratization proceeded, “the press 
seems to have given in to the pressure from the business rather than to 
achieve internal autonomy.” this is also the case from the viewpoint of 
professional norms and public service orientation. the recognition of 
journalistic norms and ethics has grown during the transitional period 
through the experiences of journalists’ associations and press unions. As 
the market competitions among newspapers became so intensified in the 
mid-1990s to the extent that they were termed as ‘the war of newspapers,’ 
journalists were succumbed to the managerial demand and, consequently, 
professional values and practices became neglected. 
under the Kim dae Jung (1999-2003) and the roh Moo Hyun (2003-
2007) administrations, conflicts between the government and the dominant 
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conservative newspapers intensified along with the disagreement on how 
to regulate and intervene in the media market. While major conservative 
newspapers, government, broadcasters, and progressive newspapers were 
in sharp conflicts against each other, the press as a whole played more of an 
advocate of political opinions than a provider of information. The picture was 
not so different for public service broadcasting when the board members of 
top management have been appointed by political parties. 
4. Government Intervention with the Media  
during the democratization, the roles of the government became unstable. 
In general, the state exerted significant influences on the regulation of public 
broadcasting and on the newspaper market, which may be a legacy from the 
previous authoritarian regimes. The state not merely managed and regulated 
the media market but also provided a significant amount of financial support 
in the form of public advertisement, subsidies to small newspapers and cable 
televisions, and monopolized the distribution of broadcasting advertisement 
through the Korea Broadcasting Advertising corporation. However, as 
democratic authority of the transitional government did not get strengthened, 
the power of the state, separate from the bureaucratic authority, over the 
media had been actually attenuated. The media regulations and policies had 
to change from unilateral controls to institutional regulations (cho 2003; 
Kang 2004; Park and chang 2000).
Institutional regulations of the state, especially via a licensing system 
for new media businesses, however, led to severe social, political conflicts, 
which became more explicit under the Kim dae Jung and roh Moo Hyun 
administrations. Particularly in that period, the government and the major 
newspapers severely clashed with each other on the issues like tax audit of the 
press and newsroom policies (yang 2001). The media reform policies initiated 
by the reformist government were resisted by the conservative newspapers, 
which led to social, political conflicts that threatened the legitimacy of the 
reformist plans in other policy areas. In summary, the traditional role of 
the strong state intervention has been substantially weakened while new 
institutional regulatory frameworks were not consolidated. each time the 
reformist policies were brought into social, political conflicts not producing 
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consensual agreements among the stakeholders, the democratic authority of 
the government got weaker. table 2 presenting major media policies of the 
government, role of the major newspapers in relation to the government, 
and responses of markets during the process of democratization shows the 
relationship between the government and the major newspapers. 
5. Functions of the Media as a Public Sphere 
Here we introduce a media-related factor that has not been discussed in 
relation to the media system: the function of the press as public spheres. 
We believe that the ways in which the media report social facts, mediate 
social conflicts, and build social consensus has significant consequences 
for the outlook of democracy especially in the process of democratization. 
For example, the British and American press undertook the function of an 
impartial public forum by conveying the arguments and opinions of political 
elites, and by performing the role of a political watchdog. This kind of press 
presumes ‘monitorial citizens’ and a competitive democracy led by liberal 
elites. Meanwhile, the democratic corporatist model of media system projects 
a role of the media as a pluralistic public sphere, the primary function of 
which is to induce consensus and compromise across the diverse sectors 
of society. Within this model, the press fulfills the role of public sphere by 
representing the arguments and opinions from various social groups. this 
kind of press presumes a pluralistic participatory democracy. Lastly, in a 
polarized pluralist society, the media show tensions among social groups, 
reveal scandals and speak for polarized ideological positions. thus in this 
kind of society, where the media as a whole presume external pluralism, each 
individual media player is highly ideological and openly advocating. these 
kinds of media expect ‘argumentative and participatory’ citizenship and 
presume pluralistic popular democracy as desirable. 
then what kind of role do the Korean media play, and to what kind of 
democracy do they expect to contribute? the Korean media designated 
to themselves the role of a representative voice of broader social sectors. 
Journalists have claimed objective reporting and independence to be 
cherished professional norm. However, we observe they in fact have played 
an advocate of political ideologies. We then wonder what kind of public 
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spheres they provide for public communication and what kind of democracy 
the kinds of public spheres presume. Before answering these questions, we 
have to take into account the interactions between the media system and the 
political system in terms of political parallelism.
IV. PoLItIcAL PArALLeLISM In KoreA 
no same processes of democratization take place between two countries 
(Bunce 2000; Geddes 1999). democratic transitions proceed in different ways 
within the same regions such as eastern europe or Latin America as well 
as across the different regions. consolidation processes after the transition 
also differ depending on the nature of transition: resistance of authoritarian 
cultures, economic growth, and religious or ethnic conflicts within civil 
society. Korean democratic transition (choi 1993; Im, H. 1999; Sohn 1997) 
and consolidation (choi 2005; Kang 2006) in post-authoritarian were not an 
exception. Korean experiences of democratic transition and consolidation 
provide so unique a pattern of democratization as to constitute a model of 
democratization. 
1. Characteristics of Korean Political System
Hallin and Mancini laid out three distinctive models of political systems. 
As shown in table 3, north Atlantic countries like the u.S. and Britain 
are characterized by liberal democracy with the tradition of moderate 
individualist pluralism and majoritarian rules, together with well-established 
legal and rational authorities. Germany and north european countries 
constitute the democratic corporatist model based on corporatist pluralism, 
a welfare-oriented state and consensual democratic traditions. In contrast, 
Mediterranean countries like Italy and Spain can be categorized as a polarized 
pluralistic model characterized by the role of strong state due to the weakness 
of civil society, ideologically and regionally polarized pluralist culture, and 
the lack of procedural rationality because of strong political clientelism.  
table 3 also presents the democratization model of political and media 
systems based on the observations of Korean experiences in comparison to 
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the Hallin and Mancini’s three Western models. With regards to the political 
system dimensions, the Korean model can be characterized by (1) a strong 
bureaucracy reinforced by developmental strategies, (2) unstable roles of the 
state depending on differing levels of governmental authorities, (3) winner-
takes-all majoritarian political culture, (4) a weak political party system, 
Table 3. characteristics of a democratization Model Based on Korean experiences 
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and (5) weak legal and rational authorities. to an extent, the Korean model 
looks similar to the polarized pluralist model of Italy and Spain. But the 
Korean political system shows a clear difference in terms, for instance, that a 
winner-takes-all majoritarian political culture prevails with little institutional 
arrangement of pluralist representation. 
The following three factors are important to characterize Korean political 
system within the process of democratization: the changing authority of 
government after the transition; the weakening of the political party system; 
the fractured nature of civil society. We believe these three factors determine 
their relationship with media systems dimensions and thus reveal one of the 
important features of Korean democracy, i.e., competing values of rationality 
and differing senses of direction in democratization. 
First, by means of the mobilization of anti-communism and industrializa-
tion policies, the traditional role of the state in Korea had been very strong 
in dominating in every part of society including the media sector. After the 
transition, however, two consecutive peaceful changes of the administrations 
brought about a systematic change of the way in which the state mobilized 
the society. As the state authority gradually divided into the administrative 
authority and the bureaucratic authority, the power of the former authority 
has been oscillated depending on the level of supports from various 
political sectors in society. For example, the two administrations after the 
democratic transition, the Kim young Sam government (1992-97) and the 
Kim dae Jung government (1997-2002), showed the typical instability of 
state administrative authorities near the ends of their administrative terms. 
even though both governments were democratic in principle, the Kim 
young Sam administration inherited the political base from the previous 
authoritarian regimes as well as big-corporations, whereas the Kim dae Jung 
administration had only received political supports from the reformative 
sectors. Both the Kim young Sam and Kim dae Jung governments did not 
have the ability to generate political supports from the oppositions and 
to produce consensual supports from civil society. they could not secure 
the leadership to the extent of keeping on their political reform and policy 
agenda near the ends of their terms. In short, the democratic administrations 
in the consolidation stage could boast their political power only in the earlier 
period of their terms. rapidly losing the grasp of political and policy agenda, 
322 Korean Social Sciences review | Vol. 1, no. 1, 2011
the democratic government effectively proved inevitability of the recurrent 
theme of lame-duck, which has constantly weakened government authority. 
Second, Korean political parties have been very weak in channeling 
the political demand and motivation into the formal terrain of politics. 
traditionally, major political parties have suffered from the chronic problems 
of regionalism, incompetent agenda-setting and poor mobilization of public 
forums. In addition, in every election, new political parties were established 
to replace the older ones just because there was the leadership change in the 
same ideological camps. Though they have been the primary political actors 
in democratic elections, political parties fail to represent people’s voices and 
to take accountability of political activities (choi 2005). Whether conservative 
or progressive, most of the institutionalized political parties have a serious 
problem of low representation. This becomes more serious when it comes to 
representing various marginalized social groups and civil society movements. 
Although progressive political parties was institutionalized during the 
consolidation stage, they had hard time to garner supports from broader 
sections of citizens because of their lack of effective policies in elections and 
low level of supports from civil society movements (Im, H. 2009). 
Third, it is ironical to observe that as the democratization proceeded, the 
institution of civil society movements was disintegrated and the momentum 
of their political activities got weaker. during the democratic transition, 
civil society greatly expanded contributing to the democratization by 
such activities as monitoring political representatives, promoting civic 
participation, setting civil agenda, and prioritizing public interests (Im, H. 
2000). For example, in the 2000 general election campaign, ‘the citizens 
Alliance for General election’ played an important role in the reform of the 
nomination processes within the major political parties and mobilized new 
generation of politicians. Korea Federation for environmental Movements 
in tandem with other environmentalist groups also successfully drew public 
attention to eco-politics that had been largely neglected by the political 
establishment. However, as democratization proceeded, activities of civil 
society movements have turned into a target of political attacks, which made 
the civil society into an arena of social and political conflicts. civil society 
movements began failing to maintain organizational coherence in producing 
consensual social and political agenda. State intervention through the 
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medium of financial subsidies has weakened the legitimacy of civil society 
movements. obviously democratization does not bring about matured civil 
society. civil society becomes more fractured as diverse social and political 
demands are organized along the lines of different sectors of civil society (Kim, 
H. 2000). 
In summary, the post-authoritarian political system in Korea demonstrates 
the characteristics of unstable government authority, weakened political parties 
and fractured civil society. After democratic institutions were introduced and 
established successfully, social norms and values that previously functioned 
within sub-systemic relations during the authoritarian era were also 
effectively disintegrated. However, democratic practices of the government, 
political parties and civil society movements were not sufficiently executed 
to the extent that newly established democratic institutions have become 
weaker through the democratization process. In addition, a ‘winner-takes-
all’ majoritarian culture continuously produced a tendency that rejects 
dialogues and negotiations among fractured political parties and civil society 
movements, which only contributed to maintaining of cientelism inherited 
from the authoritarian era. 
2. Explaining Political Parallelism
We focus on political parallelism in Korea to account for the interaction 
between media system and political system within the context of 
democratization. As shown above, political parallelism has been developed in 
a way that determines the party-press relationship in Korea. However, it is not 
our intention to argue that political parallelism is the single most important 
factor that determines the party-press relationship. rather, we claim in 
this section the ways in which political parallelism has been strengthened 
reveals the nature of the role of the news media during the process of 
democratization. 
Based on the observations of Western media system, Hallin and 
Mancini showed that political parallelism is related with the development 
of media markets, journalistic professionalization and state interventions. 
Figure 1 presents a theoretical model explaining the inter-relationship 
among the key political and media dimensions within the context of 
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Korean democratization. We attempt to show the explanatory factors such 
as journalistic professionalization, developments of political parties and 
fractured civil society have shaped the nature of political parallelism in 
Korea through the mediating factors such as strong advocacy and discursive 
struggles in public spheres as well as collusion and confrontations between 
government and the media. Th ough not shown in this fi gure, we also believe 
other political systems factors such as polarized pluralism and rational-legal 
authority also influenced political parallelism. this article limits the focus, 
however, on the three factors of professionalization of the press, developments 
of party systems and fractured civil society. 
Journalistic professionalism is evaluated by variables such as political 
independence, establishment of distinctive professional norms, and public 
service orientations (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 34-6). In Korea, journalists’ 
public service orientations were generally high due to historical legacy 
inherited from national independent movements. However, the autonomy 
of journalists from other sectors of the society and the establishment of 
distinctive norms were considered underdeveloped even in the process 
of democratic consolidation. norms and practices regarding objectivity, 
Figure 1. explanatory Model of Political Parallelism in Korea.
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impartiality, and autonomy were not pursed in the discussion of conflicting 
issues and events. thus within each of issue public spheres prepared by 
the news media, contending voices were amplified with few chances of 
moderations among the conflicting interests. Strong advocacy and discursive 
struggles in public spheres created the environment where political 
parallelism was shaped in such a way as to give the political power to the 
news media channeling the voices. By contrast, as weakened political parties 
could not represent the diverse voices in civil society, they became more 
dependent on the media’s editorial selection of voices. 
In Korea, development of political parties had a direct implication for 
political parallelism. Korean political parties, functioning as organizers of 
social interests (Schattschneider 1960), tended to instrumentalize the news 
media in order to exert influences on their coverage of political parties. In 
particular, as political parties recruited new candidates for general elections 
and communication directors for political campaigns from major news 
media, the human network between political parties and major news media 
including public service broadcasting got stronger. In addition, weakened 
political parties broadened the political space for new comers from civil 
society, which led to a dynamic style of political parallelism where the news 
media rather than political parties take initiatives in deciding whose voices 
should be heard in public spheres. that is, as political parties could not 
represent diverse voices in fractured civil society, they could not be a major 
news source for the news media. Various social movement groups bypassed 
political parties to make their voices heard in the traditional news media as 
well as in new media on the internet. 
Then what is the characteristic of political parallelism in Korea? First, it 
seems that political parallelism was getting stronger as the democratization 
process folded out in Korea. Based on a content analysis of the news reports 
on South-north Korean relations in the Kim young Sam and Kim dae 
Jung administrations, yoon (2001: 185-91) demonstrated that ideological 
differentiation of news coverage between major newspapers was made clear 
between the two administrations. And this is the period when competitions 
in Korean newspaper market became more intense. that is, in Korea, as 
competitions in newspaper market got tougher, political parallelism became 
more intense, which is quite different from the British and American cases 
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where market competition weakened political parallelism. 
As mentioned above, low professionalization of the Korean news media, 
weakened political parties and fractured civil society were the factors that had 
shaped the dynamics of political parallelism in Korea. It should be emphasized 
here that the pattern of political parallelism in Korea is quite different 
from that in the Western societies: the news media took the initiative of 
the relationship between the media and political parties, not the other way 
around. In fact, it has been pointed out several times that the Korean news 
media, especially the conservative major newspapers, became a dominant 
power agent as the society underwent democratization (cho, H. 2003; Lee 
1997; yang 1995). There was even an argument that the press has developed 
into a ‘state institution’ to claim a part of the state role (Park and chang 
2001: 93). From a modeling perspective, we find these claims have some 
points, especially considering our argument that the news media have led 
the strengthening of political parallelism in the course of democratization. In 
summary, the Korean news media, frequently replacing the roles of weakened 
political parties in channeling various voices in civil society, acted not merely 
an agent but as a main player of Korean politics by instrumentalizing social 
conflicts. Then how did this happen? What implications do the characteristics 
of political parallelism have on the democratic transition of Korea?
3. Development of  Political Parallelism in Korea
In order to examine our thesis of ‘the domination of the news media 
over the political system,’ we need to look into the changes of political 
parallelism passing through the different stages of democratic transition and 
consolidation. to show the changes in the pattern of political parallelism, we 
provide the figures illustrating political parallelism in three different stages of 
democratization. Figure 2 presents the pattern of political parallelism right 
after the democratic transition (1987-1992). It shows two horizontal lines, the 
one on the above for the ideological distribution of political parties and the 
other on the below for the ideological distribution of news media. The lines 
drawn on the vertical axis represent the cumulative distributions of political 
power as approximated by the number of voters depending on political 
ideologies: the dotted line for the authoritarian period and the solid line for 
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the democratic transitional period. Th e change of political power distribution 
basically illustrates the changes of the political power base in the democratic 
transition. that is, the overall distribution of voters was transformed from 
the skewed dotted line to the solid line. Th e overall power distribution moved 
to the left forming a ‘middling voters’ at the center of the line of political 
ideology.
Th e democratic transitional government, the roh tae Woo administration 
(1987-1992), initiated ‘limited liberalization’ in diverse social sectors 
including media market. As a result of ‘liberalization,’ a progressive daily, the 
Th e Hankyorae, could launch (illustrated as ▲d in Figure 2) and a commercial 
broadcaster Seoul Broadcasting System received a terrestrial broadcasting 
license. In this stage of democratic transition, however, the political infl uence 
of newspapers and broadcasters was not very strong although the number of 
news media increased and their sizes got bigger. 
the news media did not contribute much to democratization. Korean 
democratization was a result of the combination of the movements from the 
below and the political pacts among the power elites (choi 2005). Political 
parallelism in this period was not fully shaped yet: Th ere was little ideological 
difference between the two conservative parties: the ruling democratic 
Justice Party (A) and the opposing new democratic republican Party (c). 
Figure 2. Political Parallelism during the democratic transition (1987-1992).
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Th e ideological diff erence between other two liberal parties in opposition (B, 
d) was not so clear, either: reunification democratic Party (d) and Peace 
democratic Party (B). Th e ruling and opposition parties all took the relatively 
liberal stances in economic and social policies while they showed severe 
conflicts over the issues such as Korean re-unification and labor policies. 
under these conditions, the political orientations of major newspapers (▲a, 
▲b, ▲c) and the public broadcaster (△e) were targeting the largest readership 
and viewership, respectively. 
Figure 2 shows there was no systematic matching between political parties 
and the media. In fact, during the democratic transitional government, the 
conservative press did not have the willingness and capability to take a clear 
ideological stance distinguished from the past stance that had been violently 
regulated by the authoritarian regimes oppressive state. Similarly, the 
Hankyorae (▲d), a progressive daily, sometimes revealing a tone of editorial 
supporting the opposition parties, did not align itself ideologically with the 
opposition parties. 
rather, the newspaper played a role of checking the institutionalized 
opposition parties’ policies and ideologies from the perspective of far left 
political groups. 
Figure 3. Political Parallelism during the Initial Stage of democratic consolidation (1992-
1997).
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When the president Kim young Sam (1992-97) took the office after elected 
as the candidate of the merged conservative parties, the democratization 
process became stiffen, and party-press parallelism began to get a shape. The 
ruling New Korea Party (designated as A in Figure 3) showed more liberal 
stances in comparison to the ex-ruling democratic Justice Party. In relation 
to the National Assembly for New Politics (B) and other semi-institutionalized 
progressive political parties (e), however, the new Korea Party showed much 
more conservative stances especially on the issues of labor relations and 
South-north Korean relationships. However, the distribution of the voters 
in support of specific political parties moved to a more or less normal shape 
shown in solid line.
Mainstream conservative newspapers (▲a, ▲b, ▲c) during this period, 
already having secured commercial autonomy and then trying to lead the 
market, entered into a fierce competition among them. Based on their footing 
in the market, they began to exercise political influence on the political 
parties. The Hankyorae (▲d) continued to show their discursive leadership on 
the issues of labor, industry, and culture. due to the ideological difference, the 
opposition party could not adopt what the progressive newspaper advocated 
on the major issues, but it could not completely ignore what the newspaper 
editorialized either. 
during the later stage of democratic consolidation from the Kim dae Jung 
to roh Moo Hyun government, South Korean society witnessed accelerated 
political, social, and ideological differentiations. As shown in Figure 4, the 
distribution of political power in general changed from uni-polar to bi-
polar, resulting no strong moderate voters in the middle of the road. two 
major presidential elections ended up with a close competition between the 
two major parties mobilizing the ideologically differentiated voters.  And 
the newspapers in this period exercised a serious amount of political power 
to the extent that choi (2005: 229) declared that “after democratization, the 
press represented, consolidated, and mobilized the demands from the power 
elites.” not only major conservative newspapers (▲a, ▲b, ▲c) but also the 
progressive newspapers like The Hankyorae performed a very similar function 
of providing public spheres with strong advocacy with discursive struggles 
among various social and political groups. consequently, over the past fifteen 
years of democratic consolidation, it was the press, regardless of political 
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stances, that led ideological battles through the mobilization of political 
opinions.
Interestingly, during the latter part of the consolidation stage (1997-
2007), public service broadcasters contributed to strengthening political 
parallelism (from e to e*) shift ing its political stances in accordance with the 
incumbent political power. Internet newspapers, emerging from both side 
of the spectrum (both f and f*), rapidly expanded their infl uences. In other 
words, the news media in Korea, whether they are major newspapers, public 
service broadcasters and internet newspapers, represented ideological voices 
in society and contributed to intensifying the ideological confrontations in 
Korea. Th is resulted in increased external polarized pluralism with a limited 
development of internal pluralism, which shows a somewhat similar pattern 
of political parallelism in the media system model of Mediterranean countries 
on the outside. However, the kind of external polarized pluralism found in 
Korea is characteristically diff erent from that of the Mediterranean model of 
media system in that political parallelism got strengthened during the process 
of democratization and was led by the news media under the conditions 
of low professionalism of the news media, weakened political parties, and 
fractured civil society. 
Figure 4. Political Parallelism during the Initial Stage of democratic consolidation (1997-
2007).
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V.  concLuSIon: PoLItIcAL PArALLeLISM And ItS 
IMPLIcAtIonS For deMocrAtIc outLooK 
Based on the discussion about political parallelism in Korea, some of 
implications for the course of democratization can be drawn as follows. 
First, the news media, especially the major conservative newspapers, could 
not provide an integrated public sphere where diverse ideological groups 
could voice their opinions and show democratic outlooks. In the early stage 
of democratic consolidation, the newspapers took the role of an ideological 
fighter in fierce ‘winner-takes-all’ social and political conflicts (Kang, M. G. 
2004; rhee 2005). And this trend continues: they do not reflect social and 
political conflicts in society but actively carry out ideological warfare against 
their ideological opponents. the journalistic norms such as objectivity and 
diversity are frequently referred but only within the context of protecting 
their socio-economic status. 
In fact, the major newspapers do not even fear to engage in confrontation 
with the government. routinely regulated by the government and showing 
ideological affinity with the conservative administration, the newspapers often 
took side of the government of the day. But in order to protect their interests, 
they would resist against the government. the conflicting relationship 
between the mainstream newspapers and the government was reflected in 
the controversial tax audit on major conservative newspapers led by the Kim 
young Sam administration and the political debate over imposing the fair 
trading rule on newspaper industry during the Kim dae Jung administration. 
This became more apparent in the press reform policy of the roh Moo Hyun 
administration and in the recent controversy over the revision of media law 
by the Lee Myoung Bak government. 
By waging an ideological war against their opponents, they seriously 
restrict the democratic outlook. When covering the controversial issues 
such as reunification, foreign policy, national security, political reforms, 
environment, education and real estate, the news media reveal different 
democratic outlooks. Some are geared toward liberal democracy, others 
envision more or less participatory and egalitarian democracy. The problem 
is that there no consensual or integrated perspective emerged out of these 
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competing visions and outlooks of democracy. For example, while the 
conservative press argues for the promotion of market-oriented liberal 
democracy, the progressive press puts forward prospects of participatory 
and egalitarian democracy. depending on the assumptions behind these 
competing visions and outlooks, they provide completely different visions 
and outlooks as to what kind of democracy South Korea is heading for.
The competing democratic outlooks revealed in the news media’s coverage 
are presumed in the way in which the major newspapers functions as 
public spheres in mediating diverse controversial issues. And the problem 
is that even though they regard themselves as carrying out a liberalist or 
a participatory role of the news media within the society in the process of 
democratization, they in fact provide conflict-generating, advocate public 
spheres that have few chances of delivering social consensus among the 
conflicting parties. the dynamic nature of Korean political parallelism 
suggests the news media in Korea do not simply mediate elite opinion 
and convey group interests. they are the organizer of elite opinions and 
group interests. considering this, it is hard to believe the claim made by 
conservative news media that they identify themselves as a representative 
liberalist institution of democracy. certain they play more roles than this. 
Likewise, when the progressive media consider themselves as to play the 
role of civic participatory and deliberative democratic institution, they 
conveniently ignore the amount of conflicts amplified by their coverage of 
controversial issues. thus strangely, democratic outlook of Korean society 
seems to resemble the kinds of democracies that Korean news media 
envision. It is utterly conflicting and confusing not only to participants of 
public spheres but also to the audience in general. However, one thing clear 
is that much of the course of Korean democratization depends on the ways 
in which the news mediate public opinions and channel social interests 
functioning as public spheres. 
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